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I. INTRODUCTION
he Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA)1 was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against false,
misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable ac-
tions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection."' 2 In the twenty-four years since
the statute was enacted, the DTPA has been repeatedly amended by the
Texas Legislature, which has variously sought to limit or expand the
scope of consumer remedies. The latest revisions to the DTPA, enacted
in 1995 by the 74th Texas Legislature, govern all causes of action accruing
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998) [here-
inafter DTPA].
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
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on or after September 1, 1995, and all causes of action, regardless of when
they accrued, filed on or after September 1, 1996.3 The 1995 amendments
introduced new restrictions on the types of commercial conduct that may
form the basis of a DTPA claim, especially in disputes between businesses
and disputes involving the rendition of professional advice. The 1995
amendments also seek to exclude personal injury claims from the reach of
the DTPA. Additionally, recent amendments to the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code significantly alter the rules governing contribution
and proportionate responsibility in DTPA cases. 4
This Survey examines judicial and legislative developments involving
the DTPA from October 1, 1996, through September 30, 1997. The signif-
icant decisions during the Survey period involve consumer status, pre-
emption, contractual privity, the proper measure of damages and
defenses to DTPA claims.
II. APPLICATION OF THE 1995 AMENDMENTS TO THE DTPA
The 1995 amendments became effective on September 30, 1996.5 Dur-
ing the Survey period, no federal cases, and only five Texas cases, were
found that discussed the 1995 amendments. 6 Of those, only two, America
Online, Inc. v. Williams7 and Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello8 ad-
dressed substantive issues involving the 1995 amendments. The America




One of the most frequently contested issues in DTPA litigation is the
plaintiff's status as a consumer. In order to recover under the DTPA, a
3. See id. § 17.42 historical note (Vernon Supp. 1998) [Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 414, § 20(b), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3004.
4. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
5. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.42 (waiver); § 17.44 (construction of the DTPA); § 17.45(5)
(unconscionable conduct); § 17.45(9) (definition of "knowing conduct"); § 17.46(b)
(changes to the "laundry list"); § 17.49 (changes affecting, among other things, treatment
of claims regarding professional services, personal injuries and written contracts and plac-
ing a limit of the cap on damages per transaction), § 17.50(b)(1) (actual damages and limi-
tation on damages); § 17.50(c) (groundless and bad faith claims); § 17.505 (abatement,
mediation and settlement), and § 17.56 (venue). See generally Eve L. Pouliot, Deceptive
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 50 SMU L. REv. 1085 (1997) (discussing
legislative changes).
6. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Tex. 1997) (noting, while
not applying, limitation of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code by 1995 amendments); Be-
kins Moving & Storage v. Williams, 947 S.W.2d 568, 578 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997,
n.w.h.) (only noting amendment to DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)); America Online, Inc. v. Williams,
958 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.) (discussing mandatory
abatement provisions); Kessler v. Fanning, 953 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997,
no pet. h.) (noting change to § 17.50 requiring consumer to prove reliance to his
detriment).
7. 958 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.).
8. 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997).
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plaintiff must establish that he is a "consumer" as that term is defined in
the statute. 9 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff must be an individual
who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods or services and those
goods or services must form the basis of the complaint.' 0 Whether a
plaintiff is a DTPA consumer is a question of law."
B. THE CONSUMER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE TRANSACTION
In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.,12 the Texas
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the request by a prospective
purchaser of a company to have an independent auditor review the com-
pany's financial records would entitle that purchaser to consumer sta-
tus.13 The Court found that "[in determining whether a plaintiff is a
consumer, our focus is on the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction. '1 4
While the plaintiff in Arthur Andersen did not pay for or lease the finan-
cial services it sought, the Court, reaffirming its holding in Kennedy v.
Sale,'5 found that "the DTPA does not require the consumer to be an
actual purchaser or lessor of the goods or services, as long as the con-
sumer is the beneficiary of those goods or services. ' 16 In so holding, the
Court limited the scope of its decision to situations in which the services
were specifically required by the person claiming consumer status and
intended to benefit that person.17 The Court confirmed that a proper
analysis of consumer status should focus on whether "the purchased
goods or services are an objective of the transaction or merely incidental
to it."18
C. DOES THE TRANSACTION INVOLVE GOODS OR SERVICES?
An additional issue when determining consumer status under the
DTPA is whether the plaintiff sought or acquired "by purchase or lease,
any goods or services .. ."9 During the Survey period several cases
turned on whether the plaintiff had sought or acquired a good or service
in the transaction giving rise to the dispute.
In Sells v. Six Flags Over Texas, Inc.,20 the plaintiffs' claim focused on
the location of a gusset on which customers stepped when they exited the
9. See DTPA § 17.41.
10. See id. § 17.45(4).
11. See Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
12. 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
13. See id. at 815.
14. Id. (citing Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996)).
15. 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985).
16. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 815 (emphasis added) (citing Kennedy v. Sale, 689
S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985)).
17. See Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 815.
18. Id. (quoting Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483, 500 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
19. DTPA § 17.41.
20. No. CIV. A. 3:96-CV-1574-D, 1997 WL 527320, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1997).
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"Barnstormer" airplane ride at the Six Flags Over Texas amusement
park. Six Flags maintained that the plaintiffs did not qualify as DTPA
"consumers" because they "did not seek or acquire, by purchase or lease,
any goods or services" and because admission to the amusement park
constitutes only a revocable license to enter the park. In finding that the
plaintiffs were consumers, the court observed that "although the operator
is not obligated to perform a service, once it does so, its conduct is subject
to the DTPA.''21 While the ticket purchased by the plaintiffs was, under
Texas law, a revocable license which did not require the park to under-
take the provision of any particular service, the park was obligated to
provide advertised attractions and was required to fulfill the representa-
tions made to its customers. 22 According to the court, Six Flags' argu-
ment failed "to account for the DTPA definition of 'consumer,' which is
not necessarily coterminous with other principles of Texas law that gov-
ern statutory, contractual, or common law rights of parties. '23 The plain-
tiffs acquired consumer status by purchasing a ticket entitling them to
receive the park's services, which necessarily included the ride that alleg-
edly caused the plaintiffs' injuries24 The court further noted that "when
'consumer' status is in doubt, the DTPA and the definition of a 'con-
sumer' should be liberally construed to promote the underlying purpose
of consumer protection. '25
Finally, answering Six Flags' argument that conferring consumer status
on the plaintiffs in this case could, in an analogous situation, make theater
owners liable to their patrons should a movie advertisement fail to warn
consumers or mislead them about the content of a movie, the court noted
that "it is not proper to analyze the merits of a plaintiff's claim in terms of
whether he is a 'consumer.' 'Consumer' status is an ineluctable element
of a DTPA claim, but it does not alone confer a right of recovery on one
who enjoys such status."'26
In Garza v. Bancorp Group,27 plaintiffs alleged that misrepresentations
were made regarding options to purchase that were to have been in-
cluded in equipment leases. The misrepresentations were claimed to be
in violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),28
the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA), 29 and several provi-
21. Id. at *4-5.
22. See id. at *5.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id. (citing Galveston County Fair & Rodeo, Inc. v. Kauffman, 910 S.W.2d 129, 137
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied)). See also Bussee v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund #
1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied).
26. Sells, 1997 WL 527320, at *5.
27. 955 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
28. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692, et seq. (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
29. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01-.12 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1997), re-




sions of the DTPA. 30 The leases were for the use of security equipment,
cameras and recorders that were to be placed in two commercial stores in
Laredo.31 The leases, in fact, did not contain purchase options for the
equipment.32 The plaintiffs, however, alleged that the misrepresentations
were made by the prior owner of the equipment, who later sold it along
with the plaintiffs' lease to the defendant.33 The court found that because
the equipment was purchased for use in commercial establishments, and
not for "personal, family, household or agricultural use" as required by
section 17.46(b)(22) of the DTPA. 34 The court requested further briefing
on other DTPA claims against the defendant to specifically address the
issue of whether "invocation of the DTPA [can] overcome the express
written language that the lease agreement controls over any prior oral
representations or agreements. '35
D. INTANGIBLE ITEMS
Intangibles have long been the subject of DTPA claims.36 Recovery
under the DTPA is not allowed for transactions that involve wholly intan-
gible rights, such as accounts receivable or cash, when the intangibles are
not obtained in association with actionable collateral services. 37 Gener-
ally, where the transaction that is the basis of the claim is not a "good,"
plaintiffs have tried to make the "service" associated with the provision of
the intangible the basis of the actionable conduct. 38
A recent example is Clary Corp. v. Smith,39 which involved the issue of
whether the purchase of a business distributorship could be the basis for a
DTPA claim. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
determination that alleged misrepresentations of existing fact regarding a
distributorship were actionable under the DTPA.40 The court noted that
a business is generally regarded as an intangible, unless the purchase of
the business also encompasses goods or services purchased for use in the
30. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged violations of DTPA § 17.46(a) (prohibiting "false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices") and a series of "laundry list" violations, includ-
ing §§ 17.46(b)(1),(2), (3), (5), (12), (22) & (23). See Garza, 955 F. Supp. at 70.
31. See Garza, 955 F. Supp. at 70.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 70.
34. Id. at 72. Summary judgment on other DTPA claims asserted against a Bancorp
collection manager was granted due to lack of evidence. The court also granted summaryjudgment on the FDCPA and TDCPA claims because the transactions were entered into
for business purposes. See id. at 71-72.
35. Id. at 72.
36. See, e.g., English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983) (insurance proceeds
not goods or services); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 630 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980)
(cash not a good or service).
37. See Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 464 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet.
denied); Riverside, 630 S.W.2d at 174-75.
38. See, e.g., Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,, 889 S.W.2d 483, 500 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (plaintiff attempted to assert DTPA claim based on
a failure to purchase an intangible).
39. 949 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied).
40. See id.
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function of the business. 41 "In that event, if the plaintiff can show that
the services purchased are clearly the objective of the transaction and not
merely incidental to it, the transaction involves the transfer of 'goods or
services' for DTPA purposes. '42
The Clary court found that the distributorship agreement in that case
conferred both goods and services upon the plaintiffs. 43 In holding that
the "DTPA does not require the plaintiff himself to purchase or lease the
goods or services to be a consumer, as long as the plaintiff's reliance on
the defendant's misrepresentations concerning the goods or services
caused the plaintiff's injuries.. .. " the Forth Worth Court ratified a poten-
tially broader theory of standing in litigation involving purchases of in-
tangibles than the Supreme Court's "objective of the transaction" theory
recognized in Arthur Andersen.44
In Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. McCoy,45 purchasers of a mobile home
complained that they had been induced to agree to arbitrate their claims
with a merchant who failed to disclose the existence of the arbitration
clause to them. In denying the plaintiff's DTPA "failure to disclose"
claims under section 17.46(b)(23), the court found that an arbitration
agreement is an intangible item that cannot form the basis of a duty of
disclosure under the DTPA.46 Rather, the court held that an arbitration
agreement is simply a contract to settle disputes in an alternate forum.47
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading or deceptive act" occurred, and that such
an act was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 48 Recovery is
also dependent upon showing that the plaintiff's relationship to the trans-
action entitles it to relief.49
A. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Section 17.49(c) of the 1995 amendments specifically prevents the ap-
plication of the DTPA to claims "based on the rendering of a professional
service, the essence of which is the providing of advice, judgment, opin-
ion, or similar professional skill."'50 This "exemption," however, does not
protect "advice, judgment or opinion" that amounts to a material misrep-
resentation of fact, a failure to disclose information, unconscionable con-
41. See id. at 464.
42. Id. (citing Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, Inc., 747 S.W.2d 873, 876-77
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); Wheeler v. Box, 671 S.W.2d 75, 78
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
43. Clary, 949 S.W.2d at 464-65.
44. Compare id. at 465-66 with Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 815.
45. 944 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
46. See id. at 722.
47. See id.
48. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
49. See Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996).
50. DTPA § 17.49(c).
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
duct or breach of an express warranty.51 No cases were found during the
Survey period applying this new exemption.
As noted above,52 the Texas Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen & Co.
v. Perry Equipment Corp.53 found that a DTPA claimant does not need to
be the client purchasing professional services to qualify as a consumer.
Rather, the test is whether the plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of
the services and whether the complained-of services were the central ob-
jective of the transaction. 54
In Delp v. Douglas,55 the plaintiffs alleged that their attorneys inade-
quately reviewed and advised them regarding a settlement document con-
cluding prior litigation. In partially reversing a directed verdict for the
attorneys on some of the plaintiffs' DTPA claims, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals found that because there was evidence that the settlement
document was poorly drafted and failed to adequately protect the plain-
tiffs' interests, a jury could infer that the attorneys had violated the
DTPA in advising their clients to sign the document. 56 The court found it
reasonable that a jury also could infer that the attorneys represented that
the settlement document "had 'characteristics' or 'benefits that it did not
have and that [the] agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or
obligations which it does not have or involve.' 57 It is likely the result
would be different for cases filed after September 1, 1996, under the
newly-enacted section 17.49(c), due to that amendment's prohibition of
DTPA actions based on professional services. 58
In another case involving alleged attorney malpractice, Garrett v. Gib-
lin,59 the plaintiff complained that his attorney failed to timely bring a
medical malpractice claim against one of his doctors following knee sur-
gery. Garrett's attorneys had previously sent him a letter memorializing
the fact that Garrett had a potential malpractice action which Garrett had
instructed his attorneys not to pursue. Garrett acknowledged his agree-
ment by signing the letter. Affirming the trial court's grant of the attor-
neys' motion for summary judgment, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
found that Garrett had been fully informed by his attorneys that he had a
"potential malpractice claim" against one of his doctors and that, in ac-
cordance with Garrett's instructions his attorneys had not pursued the
claim.60 Noting that the attorneys "simply followed the certain and defi-
nite instructions of their client," the court observed that if the attorneys
actually had sued the physician contrary to the instructions of their client,
51. See id. § 17.49(c)(1)-(4).
52. See supra § 111(B).
53. 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
54. See id. at 815.
55. 948 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, n.w.h.).
56. See id. at 496.
57. Id.
58. See DTPA § 17.49(c).
59. 940 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ).
60. See id. at 410.
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"they would have exposed themselves to the risk of a malpractice suit."'61
Essentially, the attorneys were in a no-win situation. In viewing the pro-
priety of an attorney's actions, "[t]he attorney's negligence may consist
... [of] disobeying a clients' lawful instruction, [or] in taking an action
when not instructed by the client to do so .... -62 Even if Garrett lacked
full knowledge of all facts indicating his doctor's negligence, the "facts he
knew ... were sufficient to put him on inquiry which would have led to
the discovery of facts demonstrating [the doctor's] alleged negligence. '63
The court concluded that the summary judgment evidence established
that Garrett's attorneys did not violate the DTPA by misrepresenting the
quality of their services or the obligations under their agreement with
their client.64 The evidence also did not show that the attorneys failed to
disclose information pertinent to Garrett's DTPA claims or that they en-
gaged in unconscionable conduct toward Garrett.65
B. PRIVITY REQUIREMENTS
Privity of contract is not required to establish DTPA consumer status.66
Rather, as noted above, when determining whether a plaintiff may bring
suit under the DTPA, Texas law focuses on the plaintiff's relationship to
the transaction. 67
The Texas Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip-
ment68 also addressed the issue of privity between parties to a lawsuit
involving DTPA claims.69 The Court found that an audit required by the
purchaser, but paid for by the seller, prior to consummating the transac-
tion was central to the purchaser's decision.70 In support of this conclu-
sion the Court noted that determining the business' financial condition
was, in fact, the purchaser's primary objective in requesting audit.71
Thus, it was inconsequential whether the purchaser or the seller had been
in contractual privity with Arthur Andersen. 72
DTPA privity requirements in the estate planning context were ex-
amined in Vinson & Elkins v. Moran.73 In that case, the Texas Supreme
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Zidell v. Bird, 692 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ)).
See also Johnson v. Rancho Guadalupe, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1990, writ denied) (finding an attorney at law is a special agent, and only has authority to
do that which he is employed to do).
63. Garrett, 940 S.W.2d at 410 (citing Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 803 (Tex.
1975)). Of benefit to attorneys everywhere, the court noted that a "lawyer owes no duty to
foretell the future." Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996).
67. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1987).
68. 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
69. See supra § III(b).
70. See Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 815 (Tex. 1997).
71. See id.
72. See id.; see also Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 649.
73. 946 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1997).
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Court held that the beneficiaries of an estate did not have standing to
assert DTPA claims against attorneys employed by executors to assist
them in the administration of the estate.74 The Court reasoned that "it is
the executors, not the beneficiaries, who are empowered to hire and con-
sult with an attorney and to act on the attorney's advice on behalf of the
estate. '75 Under the Probate Code, "executors hire attorneys to repre-
sent themselves, not the beneficiaries, in carrying out the administration
of the estate."'76
The Court found that the executors had hired Vinson & Elkins because
of the size of the estate in question.77 Finding nothing unusual in Vinson
& Elkins' representation, the Court concluded that "[a]ny benefit of this
'purchase' would obviously extend to the beneficiaries in the form of a
more orderly administration. Possible benefits to beneficiaries were not
the main goal of the relationship but were only incidental to hiring the
attorneys. ' 78 Because the beneficiaries' benefit was "merely incidental"
to the purchase of services, the Court held that they could not maintain a
DTPA action. 79 "Public policy weighs against conferring consumer status
on estate beneficiaries. '80
In Keightley v. Republic Insurance Co.,81 the plaintiff was an assignee
of rights under an insurance contract. The Austin Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to consumer status because he had not
purchased or leased goods from the insurance company. 82 The court dis-
tinguished an assignee such as the plaintiff from an "intended benefici-
ary" under an insurance contract, holding that, in order to be a consumer,
"the circumstances must justify a conclusion that the contracting parties
intended that the stranger have the use and benefit of the goods or serv-
ices furnished under the contract. ' 83 The plaintiff, as an assignee, had
neither participated in nor been contemplated under the original
contract. 84
In Apple Imports, Inc. v. Koole,85 an automobile owner delivered her
car to an automobile dealer for the purpose of determining the vehicle's
trade-in value. The dealer, prior to consummating any transaction with
74. See id. at 408.
75. Id.; see also Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex. 1996) (holding that trustee
is empowered to hire attorney); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 242 (Vernon 1980).
76. Vinson & Elkins, 946 S.W.2d at 408.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. Note that § 17.49(c) of the 1995 amendments would appear to prevent
suits, such as this, seeking "damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the
essence of which is the providing of advice, judgment, opinion or similar professional skill."
80. Vinson & Elkins, 946 S.W.2d at 408.
81. 946 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997 n.w.h.).
82. See id. at 128. The original insurance company, National County Mutual Fire In-
surance Company, had reinsured the original insurance contract with Republic Insurance.
See id. at 126.
83. Id. at 128 (emphasis in original).
84. See id.
85. 945 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
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the owner, sold the automobile to a third party, and the original owner
sued. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the planned trade-in was
intended to form part of the consideration for the purchase of a new car
and, therefore, was an integral part of a consumer transaction.86 In so
holding, the court made the determination as to whether the plaintiff
qualified as a DTPA consumer by looking at the transaction solely from
the plaintiff's perspective.87 Because the plaintiff's complaint arose out of
a single transaction involving the attempted purchase of a new car and
because she intended that the trade-in was to be part of the consideration
for the new vehicle, the court found that there was evidence to support a
finding that there had been an "implied representation" by the dealer
that was actionable under the DTPA's laundry list provisions. 8
8
C. EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE AND AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Typically, an employee-plaintiff has been accorded consumer status
under the DTPA only when the employee purchased goods or services
intended primarily for the employee's own benefit. 89 During the Survey
period, several cases addressed this issue.
In Garner v. Corpus Christi National Bank,90 a bank employee com-
plained that he sought retirement benefits from his employer during em-
ployment, claiming that such benefits are "goods" or "services" under the
DTPA. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the
bank did not adopt its retirement benefits package for the employee's
benefit. 91 Summary judgment therefore was properly granted because
the employee failed to provide any evidence that he had sought or ac-
quired goods or services. 92
In GTE Mobilnet of South Texas v. Telecell Cellular, Inc.,93 cellular tel-
ephone sales agents complained of unfair treatment under the terms of
their agency agreements. The agents sought DTPA consumer status, ar-
guing that their claims were based on the acquisition of telephones, ad-
ministrative and advertising services, and airtime coupons from GTE
Mobilnet. The Houston Court of Appeals refused to confer consumer
status on the agents, however, finding that the aforementioned items
were not the goods and services complained about in their pleadings;
86. See id. at 898.
87. See id. (citing Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.
1983)).
88. See Apple Imports, 945 S.W.2d at 898.
89. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985) (employee complaining
of misrepresentations concerning group insurance policy provisions was consumer, even
though employer purchased policy, because he "acquired" policy benefits "by purchase"
through employer); Brandon v. American Sterilizer Co., 800 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1994, no writ) (toxic gas leak at place of employment was not basis for DTPA
claim).
90. 944 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
91. See id. at 476.
92. See id.
93. 955 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
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rather, their actual complaint focused on alleged breaches of the agency
agreement between the parties. 94 Citing Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v.
First City, Texas-Bryan, N.A.,95 the court found that the proffered "goods
and services" were "merely ancillary" to the plaintiffs' actual complaint
and could not form the basis of a DTPA claim.96
D. DERIVATIVE LIABILITY
Investors in a failed California limited partnership brought suit against
"every business remotely related to the transaction" in Cogan v. Triad
American Energy.97 The defendants included the lending bank, the loan
officer, insurance brokers, loan underwriters, accountants and other in-
vestors. 98 Claiming violations of the DTPA, the plaintiffs argued that the
defendants duped them into entering into a real estate transaction. On
appeal of the denial of the plaintiffs' DTPA claim, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas found that "[t]he DTPA
does not attach derivative liability to a defendant based on innocent in-
volvement in a business transaction." 99 Additionally, because the evi-
dence showed that the partnership was formed under California law,
involved a California business venture and "virtually every operative fact
occurred outside of the state of Texas," the DTPA claims failed because
the DTPA requires that the "trade or commerce" in question "directly or
indirectly affect the people of this state." 100
V. CLAIMS UNDER ENUMERATED DTPA CAUSES
OF ACTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The DTPA contains a number of enumerated sections, violation of
which triggers potential liability under the statute. The enumerated sec-
tions are not, however, the exclusive bases for DTPA claims. 1 1
DTPA claims generally involve one or more of the following
allegations:
94. See id. at 288-89.
95. 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
96. See GTE Mobilnet, 955 S.W.2d at 293.
97. 944 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
98. See id. at 1327.
99. Id. at 1336 (citing Charles E. Beard, Inc. v. Cameronics Tech. Corp., 729 F. Supp.
528, 532 (E.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 939 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1991) (a plaintiff cannot hold multi-
ple defendants liable under the DTPA by showing them to be "inextricably intertwined;"
the mere existence of a "relationship" between the parties does not establish DTPA
liability)).
100. Cogan, 944 F. Supp. at 1335. See also TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(6)
(Vernon 1994).
101. DTPA § 17.43 provides that the DTPA provisions are not the exclusive remedies
available to consumers. The enumerated provisions of § 17.46(b) are, however, the exclu-
sive remedy for "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" brought under
§ 17.50(a)(1). See DTPA § 17.46(d).
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(1) laundry list claims under § 17.46(b) defining the scope of
"false, misleading or deceptive acts" prohibited under the statute;
10 2
(2) unconscionable actions or courses of action by a person;
(3) breach of express or implied warranties;
(4) insurance code violations under Article 21.21; and
(5) violations of various statutes incorporating the DTPA.103
B. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
Section 17.46(b) of the DTPA contains twenty-four subparts. Plaintiffs
invoking these "laundry list"'1 04 claims are not required to prove or plead
the defendant's state of mind or intent to deceive the plaintiff.105 Nor
have plaintiffs been required to show that they relied on the alleged de-
ceptions or misrepresentations.10 6 The issue of whether a consumer
should have to show reliance, however, remains the subject of debate.107
Several significant cases involving "laundry list" claims were reported
during the Survey period.
1. Section 17.46(b)(23)-Failure to Disclose
The failure to disclose information to the consumer prior to consum-
mation of the transaction is alleged in a great number of laundry list
claims. To maintain an action for failure to disclose information under
section 17.46(b)(23) of the DTPA, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant "failed to disclose information concerning... services which was
known at the time of the transaction. °1 0 8
The proof required to sustain a claim under section 17.46(b)(23) was
addressed in Rizkallah v. Connor,109 which involved alleged unauthorized
and unnecessary repairs to an automobile. When Connor refused to con-
tinue payment for the repairs, the repair shop repossessed the car. Con-
nor brought suit alleging that the shop violated DTPA section
17.46(b)(23) by failing to disclose information regarding the repairs. The
trial court granted Connor's motion for summary judgment when the re-
102. See DTPA § 17.46(b). There are 24 enumerated laundry list items, which generally
proscribe particular types of misrepresentations or failures to disclose information. See id.
103. Statutes incorporating provisions of the DTPA include: TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 41.007, 59.005, 221.024 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 1998); TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.74(c) (Vernon 1987); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.002, 41.002(b)(1),
77.003(b) (Vernon 1997); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2006.012 (Vernon 1998); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 162.012, 164.013 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. arts. 9.48, 21.07-4, 21.21, 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp. 1998); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 4512j, 4552-5.11(f), 4552-5.18(d), 5221f, 5221L, 5221a-7, 6573a, 9020 (Vernon
Supp. 1998); and TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 684.086 (Vernon 1998).
104. The earliest located reported case reference to the enumerated items listed under
DTPA § 17.46(b) as a "laundry list" occurred in Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555
S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1977, writ ref'd).
105. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980).
106. See Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
107. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assoc., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
108. DTPA § 17.46(b)(23). See also Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. 1995).
109. 952 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
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pair shop failed to respond. The shop appealed, arguing that there had
been insufficient evidence to support summary judgment. Agreeing, the
Houston Court of Appeals observed that, to be entitled to summary judg-
ment under section 17.46(b)(23), a plaintiff must prove:
1. defendant did not disclose information concerning services to
plaintiff;
2. which information was known by defendant at the time of the
transaction with plaintiff;
3. the information was intended to induce plaintiff into a transac-
tion; and
4. plaintiff would not have entered the transaction had defendant
disclosed the information. 110
Because Connor's summary judgment evidence failed to support these
elements, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was reversed."'
In Gillespie v. Century Products Co.,112 the alleged failure to disclose
involved the use and operation of consumer products. A five month old
infant was killed in a car accident while riding in a baby car seat manufac-
tured by the defendant. Although the plaintiff styled its complaint as a
"failure to warn," the true nature of the complaint was that the warning
was inadequate. Because the plaintiffs had not even heeded the allegedly
deficient warning, however, the key issue for the San Antonio Court of
Appeals was "whether a manufacturer's failure to give adequate instruc-
tions for the safe use of its product can be the cause of an injury which
would not have occurred if the instructions the manufacturer did give had
not been ignored. '113 Answering this question in one negative, the court
held that to recover under the DTPA, plaintiffs were required to show
that "'but for' [the defendant's] failure to provide adequate warning la-
bels on the seat and the shipping box and its failure to provide an instruc-
tion book, [the child's] death would not have occurred. 11 4 Applying this
test, the court reasoned:
In the instance of no warning, it is presumed that proper warnings
would have been heeded. However, no presumption arises that a
plaintiff "would have heeded a better warning when, in fact, he paid
no attention to the warning given, which if followed would have pre-
vented his injuries." If following the warnings and instructions actu-
ally provided would have prevented the injury despite the label's
inadequacy, the deficiency could not be the cause of any injury. In
such a case, the plaintiff may have a different cause of action against
the manufacturer (e.g. deficient construction), but not one for fail-
ure-to-warn. 115
110. Id. at 589 (citing DTPA § 17.46(b)(23)).
111. See Rizkallah, 952 S.W.2d at 589.
112. 936 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
113. Id. at 52 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex.
1993)).
114. Gillespie, 936 S.W.2d at 52; see also Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773,
775 (Tex. 1995).
115. Gillespie, 936 S.W.2d at 52 (citations omitted).
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The court concluded that the adequacy of the manufacturer's warnings
was irrelevant because, due to the plaintiffs' failure to heed any warnings,
there was no evidence of a causal link between the alleged inadequate
warnings and the child's death.116
2. Section 17.45(5)-Unconscionable Actions Resulting in Gross
Disparity in Value
In transactions involving the purchase or lease of goods or services, one
who engages in an unconscionable course of action which adversely af-
fects a consumer is subject to liability under the DTPA. 117 The DTPA
defines an unconscionable action as "an act or practice which, to a per-
son's detriment: (A) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,
experience, or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or (B) re-
sults in a gross disparity between the value received and consideration
paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration. 11 8 The DTPA
defines "knowingly" as actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or un-
fairness of the act or practice." 9 The DTPA further provides that "know-
ingly" may be inferred when there are objective manifestations that
indicate the person acted with actual awareness. 20
In State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau,'2' the Texas Supreme Court found no
proof of unconscionable action by an insurer even though it had wrongly
denied the insured's claims for repairs to the foundation of their home.
State Farm paid for plumbing repairs and investigation costs but excluded
coverage for foundation repairs. Denying review of the plaintiffs' unsuc-
cessful claim that there had been a gross disparity between the value
plaintiffs received and the consideration paid for their insurance policy,
the Court found that the standard upon which gross disparity claims
should be based was "whether the disparity between what the [homeown-
ers] paid for insurance and the amounts they received under the policy
was 'glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete and unmitigated. '"1 22 Citing
its previous holding in Chastain v. Koonce,123 the Court found that the
determination of whether there has been a violation of section 17.45(5)
must be based on objective evidence.' 24 Viewing the transaction as a
whole, State Farm's actions in paying for some repairs and engineering
reports and in investigating the claim was enough to defeat the plaintiffs'
116. See id. at 53.
117. See Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983);
LaBella v. Charlie Thomas Chevrolet, 942 S.W.2d 127, 134 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ
denied).
118. DTPA § 17.45(5); see also State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex.
1997).
119. See DTPA § 17.45(9).
120. See id. § 17.45(9).
121. 951 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1997).
122. See id. at 451 (quoting Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. 1985)).
123. 700 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1985).




Arguello v. Conoco,126 involved an attempt to append a DTPA claim of
unconscionable action onto civil rights claims.127 The plaintiffs alleged
that Conoco discriminated in providing services to Hispanic and African-
American customers. The plaintiffs did not allege damages due to any
unfair advantage taken under any provisions of the DTPA, but com-
plained that they were subjected to unequal treatment solely based on
their race. In denying the DTPA claims, the Northern District of Texas
found that complaints based on a consumer's minority status are not ac-
tionable under the DTPA. "The DTPA is particularly unsuited to claims
of discrimination because the statute is designed to remedy economic, not
racial, disparities and because 'unconscionability' is defined by the objec-
tive result of the transaction, not the defendant's intent or knowledge.' 128
3. Section 17.50-Breach of Express or Implied Warranties
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties. l2 9
To be actionable under the DTPA, a warranty must be recognized by the
common law or created by statute. 130
In Bay Colony Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc.,131 a partner in a failed real
estate venture alleged that the defendant's representations about its fu-
ture involvement in the venture gave rise to an express warranty that was
breached when the venture failed. 132 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
plaintiff presented "nothing more than possible breaches of contract or
non-actionable puffing."'1 33 The alleged misrepresentations of future in-
volvement with the project were so vague as to preclude enforcement
under the DTPA. 134 Additionally, the plaintiff's complaints regarding al-
leged misrepresentations and breaches of warranty had been expressly
waived by the entirety clause contained in the written agreement between
the parties. The court found that evidence of such statements "made dur-
ing negotiations but not embodied in the contract cannot serve as the
125. See id.
126. No. CIV.A 3:97-CV-0638H 1997 WL 446433 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 1997).
127. Plaintiffs made civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (the Civil Rights
Act of 1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (civil conspiracy) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994)
(Title II (Public Accommodations) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See Arguello, 1997 WL
446433, at *1.
128. Arguello, 1997 WL 446433, at *4 (citing McClung v. Wal-Mart, 866 F. Supp. 306,
310 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Sergeant Oil & Gas Co. v. National Maintenance & Repair, Inc., 861
F. Supp. 1351, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
129. See Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); see also DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
130. See Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain v. First Nat'l Bank, 673
S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
131. 121 F.3d 998 (5th Cir. 1997).
132. See id. at 1002.
133. Id. at 1004.
134. See id. at 1005.
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basis of a DTPA warranty claim, given that disavowal. '135 Under this
analysis, although a consumer can effectively waive the right to seek
DTPA remedies only under the strict conditions specified in the
DTPA,136 a consumer can contractually "disavow" reliance on represen-
tations made prior to entering into the contract. 137
In LaBella v. Charlie Thomas, Inc.,138 an automobile lessee asserted
DTPA claims against a local automobile dealer and Mercedes Benz of
North America, alleging that the defendants refused to make or authorize
necessary repairs for his leased automobile, thereby breaching express
and implied warranties. The plaintiff complained that repairs were begun
on his automobile to determine the source of a mechanical problem, but
that once it was determined that the problem was related to misuse of the
vehicle, the dealer refused to do any further work until paid in cash for
the work undertaken to that point. 139 Relying on the Texas Supreme
Court's ruling in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,140 the
Amarillo Court of Appeals found that because the dealership had started
repairs on the automobile, there was an implied warranty to complete the
repairs in a good and workmanlike manner. 141 "[R]epairmen are not re-
quired to guarantee the results of their work, but are required to repair or
modify existing goods in this good and workmanlike manner.' 42 Once
repairs are undertaken, failure to complete them may be a breach of the
implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance actionable
under the DTPA.143
In contrast, in Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System,144 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals expressly disavowed application of an implied
warranty of workmanlike performance in the context of the provision of
medical services. 145 Relying upon Dennis v. Allison,146 the court distin-
guished Melody Home as involving an implied warranty to remedy de-
fects, which is not applicable "in a professional services setting involving
the exercise of professional judgment.' 47 The court also found that the
plaintiff's DTPA claims regarding medical services were preempted by
the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.148
In another case dealing with a purported implied warranty, Sells v. Six
135. Id.
136. See DTPA § 17.42.
137. See Bay Colony, 121 F.3d at 1005.
138. 942 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, writ denied).
139. See id. at 135.
140. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
141. See LaBella, 942 S.W.2d at 134-35.
142. Id. at 135 (quoting Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 355).
143. See LaBella, 942 S.W.2d at 134-35.
144. 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
145. See id. at 676.
146. 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985).
147. Drury, 933 S.W.2d at 677.
148. See id.; infra § VII(C).
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Flags Over Texas, Inc. ,149 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas found that Texas law does not recognize an implied
warranty that "a[n amusement park] ride is safe."'150 Such a claim merely
sounds in negligence. 151
4. Section 17.46(b)(12)-False, Misleading or Deceptive Acts
or Practices
Unlike other laundry list provisions, claims under section 17.46(b)(12)
have generally been restricted to parties standing in a direct contractual
relationship.1 52 In First American Title Insurance Co. of Texas v. Wil-
lard,153 a home purchaser alleged that, in performing a title search and
issuing title insurance to the lender, First American failed to note a blan-
ket gas line easement across the property. At trial, First American con-
ceded liability under the terms of the title insurance policy for failing to
except the gas line easement. 154 In reviewing the jury's DTPA findings
under section 17.46(b)(12), the court noted that the jury had found that
First American's false and misleading actions had been a producing cause
of the plaintiff's damages. In order to state a claim under section
17.46(b)(12), the alleged misrepresentations "must have been uttered
with reference to the terms of the underlying contract between the par-
ties."' 155 The evidence, however, showed that the title insurance policy
had been entered into between the lender and First American. There was
no evidence of a contractual arrangement between the purchaser and
First American, no evidence of any false and misleading actions toward
the purchaser by First American Title, and no evidence that the insurance
had been issued for the purchaser's benefit or that he relied on it.156 As a
result, the court concluded that the title insurer owed no duty to the
purchaser. 157
C. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE TEXAS
INSURANCE CODE
1. Article 21.21
Among the most common of DTPA claims arising out of the violation
of statutory duties are those brought pursuant to article 21.21 of the Texas
149. No. CIV.A3:96-CV-1574-D, 1997 WL 527320 (N.D. Tex., Aug. 14, 1997); see also
supra § III(c).
150. Id. at *34.
151. See id. at *4.
152. See, e.g., Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. 1990) (holding
that § 17.46(b)(12) requires proof of an agreement between the parties); Home Sav. Ass'n
Serv. Corp. v. Martinez, 788 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied)
(holding that misrepresentations must relate to an underlying contract between the
parties).
153. 949 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, writ denied)
154. See id. at 350.
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Insurance Code. 158 Section 16(a) of that article provides:
Any person who has sustained actual damages caused by another's
engaging in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article to
be ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insur-
ance or in any practice specifically enumerated in a subdivision of
Section 17.46(b), Business & Commerce Code, as an unlawful decep-
tive trade practice may maintain an action against the person or per-
sons engaging in such acts or practices. 159
During the Survey period, several DTPA plaintiffs invoked article 21.21
to complain of bad faith handling of their insurance claims.
Texas courts have recognized that the failure of an insurance company
to notify its insured of a settlement offer may be the basis of a DTPA
claim. 160 In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Bleeker,161 however, the
court recognized an additional evidentiary burden plaintiffs must bear be-
yond showing the insurer's failure to notify its insured of settlement of-
fers. Notwithstanding an insurer's failure to disclose oral and written
settlement offers to its insured, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held
that no DTPA liability could attach because the evidence failed to show
that acceptance of the offer would have prevented the insured's dam-
ages.162 "At a minimum, [the insured] needed to prove that informing
[him] of the settlement offer would have led to the offer being
accepted. ' 163
2. Legislative Change Affecting the Application of Article 21.21 to
the D TPA
The 1995 amendments to article 21.21 added language that limits in-
sured parties' DTPA claims to those that are "specifically enumerated in
a subdivision of Section 17.46(b)" of the DTPA. 164 In a footnote to Stew-
art Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello,165 the Texas Supreme Court expressly
recognized this newly-enacted limitation on claims under article 21.21.166
In so holding, the Court overruled its previous decision in Vail v. Texas
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,167 in which it had refused to limit the
availability of DTPA "bad faith" claims under the Insurance Code to
those set forth in the "laundry list. ' '168
158. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
159. Id. § 16(a); Keightley v. Republic Ins. Co., 946 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1997) opinion withdrawn, 1997 WL 420787 (Tex. App.-Austin, Jul. 24, 1997, n.w.h.)
(quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
160. See generally American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 847 n.11
(Tex. 1994); Ecotech Int'l, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, 928 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
161. 944 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
162. See id. at 679.
163. Id.
164. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
165. 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997).
166. See id. at 72 n.2.
167. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
168. Stewart Title, 941 S.W.2d at 72 n.2.
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VI. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A. REVIEW OF DUPLICATIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
In Waite Hill Services, Inc. v. World Class Metal Works, Inc.,169 an in-
sured complained of the denial of a property damage claim, alleging
breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, violations of the Texas In-
surance Code, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 170
The jury found for the insured on all of its causes of action, and the chief
issue on appeal was the measure of damages. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals reviewed Texas law governing the situation where damages are
awarded under both breach of contract and DTPA theories for the same
conduct. Typically, "actual damages"' 71 allowed under the DTPA have
been "construed to mean those damages that are recoverable at common
law.' u72 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals compared DTPA damages to
contract damages, which historically have been intended "to put a plain-
tiff monetarily in the position he would have had if the contract had been
performed.' 73 While the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that
plaintiffs may seek both DTPA and contract damages, it had done so with
the caveat that the plaintiff, if successful on both theories, would elect
whichever affords the greatest recovery.174 In the event a plaintiff fails to
make such an election, the trial court may make the election, awarding
the prevailing party the greatest recovery. 175 Applying these principles,
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that although the liability issues
submitted to the jury on the breach of contract and DTPA claims were
erroneous, the jury's answers "clearly indicate the jury's intent to find
separate damages for both DTPA violations and a different cause of ac-
tion such as breach of contract," and were not reversible. 176 The court of
appeals allowed the recovery of potentially duplicative damages under
contract law and under the DTPA solely because of the defendant's fail-
ure to object to the erroneous submission.' 77 However, in reversing on
review, the Texas Supreme Court found that error is preserved as long as
the objecting party requests the trial court to require a recovering party
to elect between duplicative damages. 78
169. 935 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996), rev'd, 959 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1998).
170. See id.
171. DTPA § 17.50 provides that a prevailing consumer may obtain "actual damages."
172. Waite Hill, 935 S.W.2d at 201.
173. Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
174. See id. at 201; see also, e.g., Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co.,
601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1980).
175. See Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. 1984).
176. Waite Hill, 935 S.W.2d at 202.
177. See id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
178. See Waite Hill, 959 S.W.2d at 184. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the
recovering party had failed to offer any evidence of, nor did it submit a distinct request for,
tort damages. See id.
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VII. DEFENSES UNDER THE DTPA
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent.179 Some courts have held that certain common law de-
fenses, such as estoppel and ratification, are not available to combat
DTPA claims.180 Other courts have recognized a variety of defenses to
DTPA claims.
A. GOOD FAITH DEFENSE TO INSURANCE CODE DTPA CLAIMS
The plaintiffs in Higginbotham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.1
8 1
and Ruch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.' 82 each appealed summary
judgments on their bad faith claims under the DTPA and Insurance
Code. 183 Applying nearly identical analyses, the courts in both cases ex-
amined the "good faith" defense available to insurers when denying in-
surance claims. Under Texas law, when an insurer has denied an
insurance claim, the insured bears the burden of showing that the insurer
had no reasonable basis for the denial of the claim.184 "A cause of action
for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists when the in-
surer has no reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of a claim
or when the insurer fails to determine or delays in determining whether
there is any reasonable basis for denial.185 Plainly put, an insurer will not
be faced with a tort suit for challenging a claim of coverage if there was
any reasonable basis for denial of that coverage. ' 186 The evidence
showed that, in each case, State Farm had conducted a thorough investi-
gation into the insured's claims and raised bona fide issues as to the via-
bility of the claims under the terms of each policy. 187 Each court reviewed
the summary judgment evidence and found that, as a matter of law, the
evidence supported the trial court's finding that State Farm did not act in
bad faith and was entitled to summary judgment on the DTPA and Insur-
ance Code claims.188
179. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture,
798 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
180. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ granted); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616
(Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA was to relieve consumers of
common law defenses while providing a cause of action for misrepresentations).
181. 103 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 1997).
182. No. CIV.A.3:96-CV-20400, 1997 WL 452743 (N.D. Tex., July 31, 1997).
183. See Higginbotham, 103 F.3d at 458; Ruch, 1997 WL 452743 at *3.
184. See Higginbotham, 103 F.3d at 459; Ruch, 1997 WL 452743 at *3.
185. Higginbotham, 103 F.3d at 459 (citing Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987)).
186. Id. at 460 (citing Emmert v. Progressive County Mut. Ins., 882 S.W.2d 32 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1994, writ denied)).
187. See id. at 459-60; Ruch, 1997 WL 452743, at *4.
188. See Higginbotham, 103 F.3d at 460; Ruch, 1997 WL 452743, at *4.
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B. A "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER
THE DTPA
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court, in Crawford v.
Ace Sign, Inc.,189 considered the overlap between the DTPA and contract
law, concluding that an allegation of breach of contract, without more,
does not violate the DTPA.190 The court determined that representations
that a party would fulfill its contractual obligations which were later un-
fulfilled did not constitute an actionable misrepresentation under the
DTPA.191 In Perez v. Alcoa Fujikura, Ltd.,192 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas adopted the reasoning of Ace in
denying a DTPA claim that was based on nothing more than a failure to
perform a contractual promise. 93
In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello,194 the Texas Supreme Court
examined a dispute involving the terms of a settlement agreement cover-
ing a previous lawsuit over Stewart Title's provision of title insurance.
Noting that a suit arising from an agreed judgment sounds in contract
rather than tort, the Court held that the insured parties were entitled only
to the contract remedies generally available when enforcing a contract. 195
The parties' prior insurer-insured relationship did not allow the plaintiffs
to extend the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing beyond the
execution of the judgment.196 "[T]he good faith duty ended when the
release was signed.' 97 Because the plaintiffs' bad faith claims failed,
their DTPA claims based on article 21.21 also failed. 198
The Amarillo Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Es-
cajeda v. Cigna Insurance Co. of Texas.199 Concluding that the plaintiff's
DTPA claim was founded on a disagreement over the interpretation of a
settlement, the court held that such a contractual dispute does not pro-
vide the basis for a DTPA claim.200
C. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
1. Medical Claims
a. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA) was
189. 917 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996).
190. See id. at 14.
191. See id.
192. 969 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. Tex. 1997)
193. See id. at 1010.
194. 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997).
195. See id. at 71-72.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 72 (quoting Torchia v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 804 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied)).
198. See id.
199. 934 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ).
200. See id. at 407.
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enacted in response to "a medical malpractice insurance crisis. 201 Re-
garding DTPA claims, section 12.01(a) of the MLIIA provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provisions of Sections 17.41-
17.63, Business & Commerce Code [the DTPA], shall apply to physi-
cians or health care providers as defined in Section 1.03(3) of this
Act, with respect to claims for damages for personal injury or death
resulting, or alleged to have resulted, from negligence on the part of
any physician or health care provider.202
Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System,203 involved the application
of this section to DTPA claims brought by a patient who received blood
other than that banked specifically for her prior to surgery. Noting that
the plaintiff's complaint arose out of the alleged negligence on the part of
health care providers engaged in the transfusion of blood, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that her DTPA claims were barred
by the MLIIA.20 4
Allegations of breach of contract, negligence and DTPA violations
against a medical association were involved in Campbell v. MacGregor
Medical Ass'n.205 Following her husband's treatment at a medical clinic
and his subsequent death, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the pro-
fessional association promised emergency treatment, did not disclose that
it had no emergency facilities or emergency physicians, and did not dis-
close that emergency referrals to other hospitals would involve expenses
not covered by the insurer.20 6 Holding that these complaints were not
defeated by the MLIIA, the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that, while a
plaintiff cannot recast negligence claims against a physician or health care
provider into DTPA, warranty, or contract claims in order to avoid the
MLIIA, the plaintiff's allegations were not that the association deviated
from accepted standards of care, which would trigger MLIIA preemption.
Rather, the plaintiff claimed that the association knowingly misled the
patient regarding the services available. 20 7
b. Application of the "Learned Intermediary Doctrine"
In In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation,208 the
plaintiffs claimed that both consumers and prescribing physicians were
not adequately warned of the side effects associated with the use of the
Norplant contraceptive device.209 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas noted that "[in a failure to warn case, the
plaintiff must show that the warning was defective and that this failure to
201. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, § 1.02(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
202. Id. § 12.01(a).
203. 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
204. See id. at 676.
205. No. 01-94-01277-CV, 1997 WL'201845 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] April 24,
1997, writ requested).
206. See id. at *6.
207. See id.
208. 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
209. See id. at 702.
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warn was the producing cause of the plaintiff's injury. ' 210 The court then
reviewed the "learned intermediary doctrine," which is a doctrine pecu-
liar to cases involving a prescription drug manufacturer's duty to warn.
211
Under Texas' interpretation of this doctrine, "when a drug manufacturer
properly warns a prescribing physician of the dangerous propensities of
its product, the manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who
receives the drug. The doctor stands as a learned intermediary between
the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. '212 The physician's knowl-
edge of the warnings operates to protect the manufacturer and serves to
shift the duty of explaining risks to the physician unless the warnings pro-
vided to the physician are inadequate or misleading.21 3 Applying these
principles, the court found that the basis for the plaintiffs' DTPA claims
was a failure to warn or disclose information which, under the learned
intermediary doctrine, could not be pursued against the prescription drug
manufacturer. 214
2. Federal Cigarette Legislation
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court dealt with the ap-
plication of the DTPA to damages related to cigarette use in American
Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell.215 The survivors of a smoker alleged that Amer-
ican Tobacco failed to disclose information about the dangers of smoking
and made deceptive representations in advertising its cigarettes.216 The
Court found that because the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (FCLAA) and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
(PHCSA) 217 were enacted prior to the effective date of the DTPA, they
preempt claims of failure to disclose information in cigarette advertising
or promotional materials.21 8 The Court also held that deceptive repre-
sentation claims under the DTPA are preempted by the FCLAA and the
PHCSA because advertising content and warnings for tobacco products
are governed by those statutes.219
3. RCLA Claims
The Residential Construction Liability Act (RCLA) specifically
preempts application of the DTPA where the two statutes conflict.220 By
its terms, the RCLA applies to "any action to recover damages resulting
210. Id. at 703 (quoting Rolen v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 856 S.W.2d 607, 609-10
(Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied)).
211. In re Norplant, 955 F. Supp. at 703.
212. Id. (quoting Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex. 1986)).
213. See In re Norplant, 955 F. Supp. at 703.
214. See id. at 709.
215. 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
216. See id. at 425. The plaintiffs alleged violations of DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(5),(7) and
(23). See id.
217. Both Acts are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (West Supp. 1997).
218. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 440.
219. See id.
220. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
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from a construction defect.1221 In the only reported RCLA case during
the Survey period discussing the DTPA, O'Donnell v. Roger Bullivant of
Texas, Inc.,222 the plaintiffs gave notice of their claim under DTPA sec-
tion 17.505, which provides for sixty days notice prior to filing suit. The
court found that the DTPA notice letter was sufficient to put the defend-
ants on notice of RCLA claims that were based on the same conduct as
their DTPA claims.223
4. Failure to Provide Notice Required by the DTPA
a. Putting a Defendant on Notice of a DTPA Claim
Generally, a petition "does not need to set forth the formal title of the
DTPA or indicate the specific sections in order to allege a DTPA
claim. '2 24 Rather, a DTPA pleading is "sufficient if it gives fair and ade-
quate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim. 12 25 In
Brown v. Henderson, an automobile owner brought suit in a justice of the
peace court complaining of "unauthorized work and failure to use dili-
gence in proper care" of the plaintiff's automobile. 226 The petition
"sought 'Triple Damages AND The Maximum Amount of Two-Thou-
sand-Five-Hundred-Dollars And NO Cents Allowed IN Small Claims
Court Under Texas Law, ($2,500.00), (TEXAS CONSUMER FRAUD
LAW) [sic].' ' 227 The justice court denied relief. The owner thereafter
filed a separate action in county court alleging claims under the DTPA
and complaining of false, fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive conduct
in connection with repairs made to his vehicle. On appeal of a summary
judgment finding that the DTPA claims were collaterally estopped and
barred by res judicata because of the justice court's prior judgment, the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals concluded that the justice court plead-
ing was sufficient to allege a claim for relief under section 17.50 of the
DTPA, had been "finally adjudicated in the justice court" and was
"barred by res judicata in any subsequent suit brought on the same
grounds. '228
b. Notice Under DTPA Section 17.505
As a prerequisite to filing suit under the DTPA, a consumer must give
at least sixty days prior written notice to the person to be sued, advising
221. Id. § 27.002.
222. 940 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
223. See id. at 419. RCLA § 27.004(b) allows for a forty-five day notice period prior to
filing suit.
224. Brown v. Henderson, 941 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no
writ). See also Holland Mortgage and Inv. Corp. v. Bone, 751 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fiberglass Specialties,
Inc., 638 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d
598 (Tex. 1985).
225. Brown, 941 S.W.2d at 192.
226. Id. at 191.
227. Id. (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 193.
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
that person of the consumer's complaint and the amount of damages
claimed, including attorneys' fees. 229
In America Online, Inc. v. Williams,230 the Houston Court of Appeals
found that the newly-enacted automatic abatement provisions under
DTPA section 17.50(b)(1) apply to lawsuits, specifically including class
action lawsuits, filed after September 1, 1996, and that the defendant had
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the DTPA to be entitled to
automatic abatement without hearing. 231 In so holding, the court re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument that abatement was not required because
they also sought relief under provisions of the DTPA other than section
17.50(b)(1). 232 The court found there was no "due order" of pleading
required for an abatement and that abatement is automatic under the
1995 amendments. 233 Accordingly, the court reversed the class action
designation of the plaintiffs that occurred during what should have been
the abatement period, finding that the defendant had not received proper
notice necessary from the plaintiffs. The case was automatically abated,
without necessity of hearing, for sixty days after notice from the originally
named plaintiffs. 234
All other decisions during the Survey period that addressed the notice
period were in cases filed prior to September 1, 1996. In K.C. Roofing
Co. v. Abundis,235 the defendant argued that the trial court erred in treb-
ling damages and awarding attorneys' fees because there was no evidence
that the defendant was given notice of the plaintiffs' claims under DTPA
section 17.505.236 The plaintiffs admitted that they did not give sixty days
written notice of their claims, but relied on the exception permitting the
filing of suit when necessary to prevent the expiration of the statute of
limitations. 237 The defendant filed an unverified plea in abatement but
never set the matter for hearing. 238 The court found that
229. See DTPA § 17.505(a).
230. 958 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.). The decision
was issued on November 20, 1997, after the end of the Survey period. It is included here
because of its significance in being the first reported decision applying the 1995
amendments.
231. See id. at *9.
232. See id.
233. See id. at *8.
234. See id. at *9-10.
235. 940 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
236. See id. at 377. The defendant also complained that proper notice was not received
pursuant to § 38.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or § 27.004 of the
Texas Property Code. Under the latter provision, a plaintiff seeking damages arising from
a "construction defect" must give written notice to the contractor at least sixty days before
filing suit. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
237. See DTPA § 17.505(b); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(c) (Vernon Supp.
1998) (similar exception).
238. See Abundis, 940 S.W.2d at 378. In order to trigger the automatic abatement pro-
visions in the version of the DTPA in effect at that time, a verified plea was required.
DTPA § 17.505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996). Under the 1995 amendments to the DTPA, how-
ever, the abatement period is now automatic without the necessity of verified pleadings.
Compare DTPA § 17.505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996) with § 17.505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
[Vol. 51
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
[w]here there is some evidence of notice, or legal excuse for failing to
give notice, and no effort on the part of the party contesting these
facts to get a hearing or finding, Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the omitted issue of notice under the DTPA
be deemed as found by the trial court in support of its judgment.239
5. Offers of Settlement
In line with the Legislature's intent that notice be given sixty days prior
to filing a claim, the DTPA also affords a defendant that same time pe-
riod in which to make a reasonable settlement offer.240 If the amount
tendered in the settlement offer is the same or substantially the same as
the actual damages found at trial, the consumer may not recover an
amount in excess of the amount tendered in the settlement offer or the
amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact, whichever is less. 24
1
In Cain v. Pruett,242 the defendant made such a pre-suit settlement of-
fer. The court, however, found that the offer did not conform to the re-
quirements of section 17.505(c) because it did not include language
agreeing to reimburse the plaintiffs for their reasonable attorneys' fees.243
The court concluded that settlement offers that fail to meet the express
statutory guidelines governing such offers will not limit a plaintiff's ulti-
mate recovery of damages or attorneys' fees awarded at trial.244
6. Limitations
DTPA claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.2 45 A
DTPA claim accrues when "the consumer discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false,
misleading, or deceptive act or practice. '246 In Harrison County Finance
239. Abundis, 940 S.W.2d at 378; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 279; Cielo Dorado Dev., Inc.
v. Certainteed Corp., 744 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. 1988); Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.
1992) (holding that in order to trigger the DTPA notice period the abatement must be
heard by the court).
240. See DTPA.
241. See id. § 17.505(d).
242. 938 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
243. See id. at 157.
244. See id. The court noted however that the settlement offer would have an effect on
the calculation of prejudgment interest on any damages found by the trier of fact under
article 5069-1.05. See id. at 157-58.
245. See DTPA § 17.565.
246. Eshelman v. Shield, 764 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. 1989); see also Harrison County Fin.
Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 948 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997,
pet. granted).
The discovery rule is designed to prevent injustice by delaying accrual "in
circumstances where 'it is difficult for the injured party to learn of the negli-
gent act or omission."' The discovery rule therefore would be feckless if it
did not delay accrual until discovery of "the negligent act or omission." This
conclusion is not irreconcilable with the "nature of the injury" cases. The
"discovery of the possibility of some injury" is not equivalent to the discov-
ery of the nature of an injury. A party does not discover the "nature" of his




Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
observed that the discovery rule does not apply to most express warranty
claims.247 Reinstating the plaintiffs' claims, the court confirmed that sec-
tion 17.565 makes DTPA claims subject to the discovery rule.248
In Hartman v. Urban,2 49 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals enforced
the express command of the DTPA that its provisions "apply only to acts
or practices occurring after the effective date of this subchapter, '250 and
found that the discovery rule did not apply where the alleged wrong oc-
curred prior to the statute's enactment.2 51 Although the plaintiffs argued
that an erroneous plat filed in the county clerk's records constituted a
"continuing misrepresentation," the court concluded that "the presence
of [the] plat at the county clerk's office constituted neither an 'act' nor a
'practice.' ' 252 In so holding, the court reasoned that, for purposes of the
DTPA, a "'continuing misrepresentation' ... involves actual, active assur-
ances and reassurances of something by the party sued. '253 The defend-
ants' filing of the plat prior to the effective date of the DTPA therefore
was not actionable under the statute. The court concluded that "[t]he
substantive rights and duties of a party pursuant to an agreement are
those under the law as it existed' at the time the agreement was made. A
subsequent law that changes those rights and duties would violate the
Texas Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws." 254
D. No PRODUCING CAUSE
When determining whether the actions complained of are the produc-
ing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether the alleged
cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's injury and
without which the injury would not have occurred. 255 To sustain a DTPA
claim, the plaintiff's showing of producing cause does not require a find-
ing that the injury was foreseeable. 256 "Producing cause" has been de-
fined as "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which in a natural
sequence, produced injuries or damages complained of, if any."'2 57
In Kessler v. Fanning,2 5 8 the plaintiffs hired an inspection service to re-
view the condition of a home prior to purchase. The inspection failed to
247. See Harrison County, 948 S.W.2d at 948.
248. See id. at 943.
249. 946 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
250. DTPA § 17.63 (Vernon 1987). .
251. See Hartman, 946 S.W.2d at 551.
252. Id.
253. Id.; see Padre Island Inv. Corp. v. Sorbera, 677 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, writ dism'd) (continuing misrepresentations require active assurances to the
complaining party).
254. Hartman, 946 S.W.2d at 551 (citing Cape Conroe Ltd. v. Specht, 525 S.W.2d 215,
219-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ)).
255. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
256. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
257. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975).
258. 953 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
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include the surrounding property and drainage on the lot upon which the
home was located. The sellers did not disclose any drainage problems
and the purchasers did not discover drainage problems until some time
well after the purchase when the house flooded. The record supported a
finding that, but for the seller's failure to disclose the drainage problems,
the purchase would not have occurred.259 As a result, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals concluded that there was evidence showing that the
defendants' failure to disclose was a substantial factor in the plaintiffs'
decision to buy the house, which led to their injury.260
E. "PUFFING"
The DTPA does not specifically mention opinion or "puffing" as a de-
fense.26' In addition to questions regarding the producing cause of a
plaintiff's injuries, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Kessler, also ad-
dressed the "puffing" defense.2 62 Previously, the Texas Supreme Court
found that misrepresentations are actionable under the DTPA "so long as
they are of a material fact and not merely 'puffing' or opinion. '263
"Although a 'puffing' or 'opinion' defense often pertains to warranty
cases, courts have ... allowed an 'opinion' defense in misrepresentation
claims brought under [DTPA subsections 17.46(b)(5) and (7)]. ' ' 264 The
Kessler court noted that courts
have generally considered three factors in determining whether a
statement is opinion or actionable misrepresentation: 1) the specific-
ity versus vagueness of the statement, 2) the comparative knowledge
of the buyer and the seller, and 3) whether the representation per-
tains to a past or current event or condition versus a future event or
condition. 265
The court concluded that the "puffing" defense was unavailable because
the sellers had superior knowledge of the condition of the property and
the alleged acts or omissions were not vague or so pertaining to a future
event or condition as to be mere opinion or puffing. 266 Rather, the
seller's statements concerned items clearly within their knowledge and
within their experience as property owners.267
259. See id. at 519.
260. See id.
261. See Humble Nat'l Bank v. DCV, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
262. See id. at 519.
263. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980).
264. Kessler, 953 S.W.2d at 519 (citing Humble Nat'l Bank, 933 S.W.2d at 229-30; Hed-
ley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 838-39 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993,
writ denied) (op. on reh'g); Parks v. U.S. Home Corp., 652 S.W.2d 479, 484 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).





F. APPLICATION OF PROPORTIONATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
THE DTPA
As an additional part of tort reform litigation, the 1995 Legislature ad-
ded the DTPA to the list of torts and statutory violations for which de-
fendants may seek proportionate responsibility for a plaintiff's damage
claims.268 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.002(h), ef-
fective for claims accruing after September 1, 1995, and for actions filed
after September 1, 1996, specifically applies the proportionate responsi-
bility statute to the DTPA.269
During the Survey period, the defendant in Waite Hill Services, Inc. v.
World Class Metal Works, Inc.270 sought to invoke the new proportionate
liability law. Noting that the lawsuit was filed prior to the effective date
of the 1995 amendments, the court observed that under the prior law,
"common-law defenses such as contributory negligence could not defeat
recovery on causes of action asserted under the DTPA or Texas Insurance
Code. ' 271 The comparative liability statute in effect at the time of the
filing of that lawsuit exempted all actions brought under the DTPA ex-
cept for those specifically authorized by DTPA section 17.50. "Effective
September 1, 1995, an amendment to section 33.002 made the compara-
tive liability statute available in an action brought under the DTPA, but
not in a cause of action, like that of [the defendant], that accrued before
September 1, 1995 and on which suit was filed before September 1,
1996.,'272
VIII. VENUE
In a case that should serve as a caveat to those drafting choice of forum
clauses, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently administered a nar-
row construction of such clauses. In Thompson and Wallace of Memphis,
Inc. v. Falconwood Corp.,273 the court dealt with the applicability of a
contractual choice of law clause to a DTPA claim.2 74 The parties had
entered into various contracts for the financing of purchases of cotton.
The plaintiff argued that a choice-of-law provision applying to the "agree-
ment and its enforcement" required the application of New York law and
precluded application of the Texas DTPA.275 Rejecting this argument,
268. See TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(h) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
269. See id. § 33.001. The statute provides that "a claimant may not recover damages if
his percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent." Id.
270. 935 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996), rev'd, 959 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1998)
(on other grounds).
271. Id. at 202.
272. Id. (citing Act of May 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, §§ 17, 20, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3003-04 (current version at TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002 (Vernon
Supp. 1998)). Application of the new comparative responsibility scheme to DTPA claims
also was briefly discussed in Lewis & Lambert Metal Contractors, Inc. v. Jackson, 914
S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994) vacated by agr., 938 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1997).
273. 100 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1996).
274. See id. at 432-33.
275. Id. at 432-33.
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the court found that because the choice-of-law provision was narrowly
drawn and did not specifically include tort or statutory causes of action, it
did not apply to the plaintiff's DTPA claims.2 76
The Falconwood court next applied the Texas choice-of-law standards
set forth in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 277 Under that analysis, be-
cause the contacts and relationship of the parties were so attenuated to
Texas, Texas was not the state with the "most significant relationship" to
the events, thus precluding application of the DTPA to the lawsuit.2 78 In
sum, the narrow drafting of the contract allowed for institution of a Texas
DTPA claim, but the facts of the case did not.
IX. CONCLUSION
The present incarnation of the DTPA was fashioned to present a more
favorable business climate while continuing to offer substantial protection
to traditional consumers. Even prior to widespread implementation of
the 1995 amendments, Texas courts appear to have closed the door to
many plaintiffs seeking consumer status under the DTPA. The challenge
for Texas courts in the years to come will be to give effect to the legisla-
ture's intent to curb excessive applications of the DTPA without denying
legitimate consumers the significant benefits that the DTPA offers in
comparison to common law remedies.
276. See id. at 433; see also, e.g., Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1990);
Busse v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund # 1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1995, writ denied).
277. 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984).
278. 100 F.3d at 433.
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